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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Respondent, Robert E. Froerer, adopts the statement of 
jurisdiction submitted by Respondent, Attorney's Title Guaranty 
Fund Inc. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
Respondent, Robert E. Froerer (Froerer), is involved 
in only part of the issues that are presented on appeal. The 
issues relating to Froerer were resolved by summary judgment. 
The issues on appeal relating to Froerer are as follows: 
1. The Respondent, Froerer, adopts the statement of 
issues set forth in Respondent, Attorney's Title Guaranty Fund, 
Inc.'s Brief numbered one through four. 
2. In addition to those issues related above, this 
Court must determine whether or not the District Court was 
correct in ruling that Combes had no cross-claim against Robert 
E. Froerer for malpractice, either as a title abstractor or as an 
attorney. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
There are no determinative constitutional provisions. 
Respondent relies on the following statutes: 78-12-25, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953 (as amended). 
Within four years: 
(1) an action upon a contract, obligation or 
liability not founded upon an instrument in 
writing; also on an open account for goods, 
wares, and merchandise, and for any article 
charged in a store account; also on an open 
account for work, labor or services rendered, 
or materials furnished; provided, that action 
in all of the foregoing cases may be 
commenced at any time within four years after 
the last charge is made or the last payment 
is received. 
(2) an action for relief not otherwise provided for by 
law 
STATEMENT OF CASE AND FACTS 
On August 4, 1986, cross-defendants, Keith and Evelyn 
Combe filed cross-claims against the defendant, Robert E. 
Froerer, claiming in their first cause of action negligence as an 
attorney and alleging in their second cause of action some claim 
for either breach of contract or tort liability. The allegedly 
negligence acts occurred, if they occurred at all, in 1979. All 
of the issues between Appellants and Froerer were decided by 
summary judgment. (R.912). The material undisputed facts 
considered by the Court at the time of the motions for summary 
judgment were taken from the pleadings and from the deposition 
testimony of Keith B. Combe, Robert E. Froerer, and Steve Keil. 
The statement of facts set forth in Appellants' brief 
are not particularly relevant to Robert Froerer as it for the 
most part contains facts brought out at trial. Froerer did not 
participate in the trial, as the trial concerned issues and 
claims between Combes and the Plaintiff/Respondent, Breuer-
Harrison, Inc. Respondent Froerer would therefore request that 
2 
this Court consider only the facts that were before the trial 
court at the time the summary judgment was rendered. The 
material undisputed facts are as follows: 
1. Keith and Evelyn Combe were the owners of real 
property located in Weber County, State of Utah, which they had 
received from the parents of Keith B. Combe in 1962. (R.1411, 
Combe Depo., Exhibit 1) 
2. The property was subject to an easement established 
by the District Court pursuant to a complaint filed by the Weber 
Basin Water Conservatory District for condemnation. The lawsuit 
was tried and judgment entered on May 23, 1960. The court 
awarded damages to the Combes for the value of the property. 
Weber Basin Water Conservancy District placed a pipeline through 
the property pursuant to their easement. (R.797, Ex. A). 
3. Robert E. Froerer is an attorney at law practicing 
in Ogden, Utah. He is also licensed by the State of Utah to 
write policies of title insurance (Froerer, deposition P.3, 16)1 
4. Sometime in 1979, Froerer was contacted by Steve 
Keil, a real estate salesman, and asked to do certain legal work 
in connection with a real estate transaction involving property 
in Ogden, Utah, wherein Keith B. Combe and other members of his 
1
 The Froerer deposition is included at the Record at page 
1418. The Keil deposition is included in the Record at page 
1419. 
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family were sellers and Casper J. Breuer and William M. Harrison 
(and Steve Keil) were buyers. (Froerer deposition p. 6, Keil 
deposition pp.22, 24-25). 
5. Froerer prepared a contract in connection with the 
real estate transaction and also prepared other documents and 
revisions for the sale. One of the documents was a real estate 
contact between sellers and buyers which was dated December 29, 
1979, and signed by all the parties. (There were some later 
amendments to the agreement that are not material.) (Froerer, 
deposition pp. 6, 7, 35, exhibits 19-25). 
6. In connection with the documents prepared, Froerer 
always considered his client to be Steve Keil, one of the 
ultimate purchasers. (Froerer deposition pp. 5, 6, 38, 39, 43.) 
Combe was not even sure who Froerer represented. (Combe 
deposition p. 30). Combes had all documents reviewed by their 
personal attorney, Paul Kunz (Keil deposition p. 25). Froerer 
was paid out of the proceeds of the sale sometime after the 
closing. The closing occurred on December 29, 1979. (Froerer 
deposition pp. 8, 35). 
7. After the sale had closed on December 29, 1979, 
(which by the way occurred outside the presence of Froerer and 
without his actual knowledge) Froerer agreed to provide title 
insurance on the transaction. No preliminary title report had 
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been requested by the buyers or sellers. (Froerer deposition 
p.52). No preliminary title report had ever been issued or 
relied upon by any party. In fact, no preliminary title report 
was ever in existence. 
8. Combes acknowledged that no preliminary title 
report had been issued and in fact did not even know that Froerer 
was going to issue a policy of title insurance until after the 
transaction was closed. (Combe deposition p.139). 
9. A policy of title insurance was eventually issued 
by Froerer at the request of buyers on November 14, 1980, more 
than ten months after the sale. The underwriter on the policy 
issued by Froerer was ATGF. The policy of title insurance is 
attached as addendum one to ATGF's Respondent's brief. 
10. The policy of title insurance did not make an 
exception for the aqueduct easement granted to Weber Basin Water 
Conservatory District. See, addendum to ATGF's Respondent's 
brief. 
11. At some later date, the aqueduct easement was 
discovered by buyers Breuer-Harrison and an action was commenced 
by them to rescind the real estate contract. (Plaintiffs' 
Complaint R-l). 
12. On May 6, 1986, the court found as a matter of 
law on summary judgment that the buyers were entitled to have the 
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contract rescinded because the aqueduct easement constituted a 
substantial encumbrance upon the fee title; that the sellers 
could not perform their contract of delivering an unencumbered 
title to the buyers; and buyers were not required to accept the 
defective title. (R. 509, 521). 
13. In this action, sellers Keith B. Combe and Evelyn 
Combe filed cross-claims against Froerer and ATGF in August, 
1986, (R. 563), to seek damages against Froerer based upon his 
negligence for breach of duty as an attorney (first cause of 
action): and to seek damages against both Froerer and ATGF based 
upon the issuance of a policy of title insurance (second cause of 
action). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Froerer's argument on appeal may be summarized as 
follows: 
1. Froerer adopts the argument submitted by ATGF 
numbers 1 through 7 on pages 7 and 8 of their Respondent's brief. 
2. Robert E. Froerer was not the attorney representing 
the sellers in the transaction, but was representing the buyers 
and as such had no duty to protect the interests of the sellers. 
3. The Combes had their own personal attorney, Paul 
Kunz, review, modify and approve all documents prepared by Steve 
Keil's (Buyers) attorney. 
6 
4. Froerer alleged negligence caused no damage to 
Combe. 




The Respondent, Froerer, had two cross-claims filed 
against him by Appellant Combes in their amended cross-claim on 
the 4th of August, 1986 (R.563). The first cause of action was a 
claim for attorney's negligence. Although, the Combes had 
previously filed a cross-claim against Froerer this amended 
cross-claim was the first time the cause of action for attorney 
negligence was asserted against Respondent Froerer. This date 
was more than six and half years after the alleged negligence 
could have occurred. 
The second cause of action (although it is difficult to 
determine what type of claim is submitted) is against Froerer and 
Attorney's Title Guaranty Fund allegedly under the contract of 
insurance that was issued almost a year after the sale of the 
property. The Respondent Froerer herein adopts the argument and 
legal reasoning set forth by Respondent Attorney's Title Guaranty 
Fund in Points one through four of their Brief. See, Attorney's 
Title Guaranty Fund, Inc.'s Respondent's brief pp. 8-24. The 
7 
points and authorities set forth below will specifically deal 
with Appellant's first cause of action in their amended cross-
claim. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The cross-claim of Combes against Froerer were disposed 
of by summary judgment. This Court must therefore analyze the 
facts and inferences in the light most favorable to the losing 
party. Atlas Corp. v. Cloverus National Bank, 737 P.2d 225, 229 
(Utah, 1987). The court below determined that based upon the 
material undisputed facts Combes had no claim against cross-
defendant Froerer as a matter of law. Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure 56(c). In order for the Combes to overcome the 
undisputed facts, they had to submit evidence that would have 
created a genuine issue of fact. If reasonable minds could not 
differ on the facts as presented, then the Court could rule as a 
matter of law that the Combes had no claim against Froerer for 
attorney negligence. Singleton v. Alexander, 431 P.2d 126 (Utah, 
1967), FMA Acceptance Co. v. Leatherby Insurance Co., 594 P.2d 
1332 (Utah, 1979). 
There were several reasons asserted by Froerer in the 
court below as to why Combes' claim was invalid. If this Court 
can sustain the verdict on any reasoning, the summary judgment 
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should stand- Milliner v. Elmer Fox & Co,, 529 P.2d 806 (Utah, 
1974). 
In this particular case in order for Combes to sustain 
their claim for negligence against Froerer they must show all of 
the following: 
1. That Combe retained Froerer as his attorney to 
represent his interests in the real estate transaction, and that 
Froerer accepted the retention-
2. That Froerer breached his duty to Combe by failing 
to perform his duty to the standard of care as required by Utah 
law. 
3. That Combe suffered some damage that was 
proximately caused by the actions of Froerer. 
4. That Combes' claim was filed within the applicable 
limitation time period as established by Utah law. 
POINT I 
FROERER WAS NOT COMBES' ATTORNEY AND THEREFORE HAD NO 
DUTY TO PROTECT THEIR INTERESTS 
The attorney/client relationship is one created by 
contract. To establish a contract, there must be evidence of an 
offer or a request for legal services or advise by a client and 
an acceptance by the attorney. A meeting of the minds must occur 
that establishes the rights and duties of the parties to the 
9 
contract. The terms must be concise enough for a court of law to 
interpret and enforce. Connelly v. Wolf, Block, Shorr, & Solis-
Cohen, 463 F.Supp. 914 at Page 919 (E.d. Pa. 1978) 2 
In this particular case, Froerer believed himself to 
be representing the buyers and therefore should be specifically 
looking out for their interests. If Combe thought otherwise, he 
should have put Froerer on notice of his intentions. 
Although, Combes' attorney states repeatedly that 
Combe hired Froerer and that Froerer was Combe's attorney, there 
are no facts in the record to support this conclusion. The 
record clearly shows that Steve Keil contacted Froerer and 
requested him to prepare documents. (R.1419, Keil Depo. pp. 22, 
24-25). The record contains no evidence that Combe went to 
Froerer's office and requested his services prior to the closing 
of December 29, 1979. The record also clearly showed that before 
Combe would agree to sign any documents, they took them to their 
1
 Establishing the attorney/client relationship for legal 
malpractice action differs from establishing attorney/client 
relationship for conflict of interest cases. In a legal 
malpractice action, a client must show more than a mere 
divulgence of information to establish the attorney/client 
relationship. In a conflict of interest case even though an 
attorney/client relationship may never have been established, cin 
attorney may be precluded from representing another client 
against the original party who divulged information. This is 
because of the high standard placed upon attorneys under the Code 
of Professional Responsibility for Fairness. Margulies v. 
Upchurch, 696 P.2d 1195 (Utah, 1985). 
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personal attorney, Paul Kunz, who reviewed the documents, 
modified the documents and approved the documents• (R.1419, Keil 
Depo. p. 25). 
Combe on one occasion stated that he did not even know 
who Froerer represented. (R. 1411, Combe deposition, p. 30). 
Combe never denied that his attorney Paul Kunz reviewed the 
documents, made modifications, and then approved the documents. 
The court therefore ruled as a matter of law that Froerer owed no 
duty to Combe. Combes had the burden to establish that Froerer 
was their attorney. Combes failed to do this by any competent 
evidence. 
The mere fact that Froerer was paid out of the proceeds 
of the sale does not establish attorney/client relationship. In 
this particular case and as in most real estate transactions, 
costs were paid out of the proceeds of a sale. One could argue 
that the proceeds for sale were actually paid by the Buyers 
since they were the ones who deposited the money for closing. 
It is interesting to note that the costs were not paid until 
after the purchasers and sellers had obligated themselves under 
the contract. 
Combe would have this Court believe that since Froerer 
prepared some documents that he owed a legal duty to Combes. 
That is simply not the fact. Our adversarial system requires 
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that an attorney prepare documents that will protect his client. 
An attorney is not obligated to prepare documents that are to 
protect the opposing parties rights to the detriment of his own 
client. 
Combe had the duty to present evidence to the Court 
that would raise a material issue of fact concerning his 
employment of Froerer. Other than his attorney's conclusory 
statements that Combe hired Froerer no actual evidence was 
presented which would show a meeting of the minds between Combe 
and Froerer. Therefore, Combe failed to create even a question 
of fact upon which reasonable minds could differ and the Court 
was correct in dismissing his claim for attorney's malpractice. 
POINT II 
IF WE ASSUME THAT COMBE IS CORRECT IN STATING THAT FROERER 
WAS REPRESENTING BOTH CLIENTS IN THE TRANSACTION THEN 
COMBES' CLAIM FOR ATTORNEY MALPRACTICE FAILS 
AS FROERER BREACHED NO DUTY TO COMBE 
Combes admit that Froerer was representing Steve Keil, 
the real estate agent who was the developers agent and who was or 
would shortly become the developers partner. (See, Combes' Brief 
at P. 32). Combe then further states that Froerer understood 
that he had been hired by the Combes to perform, all work 
necessary to complete the transaction. This is not a correct 
reading of the deposition. Froerer only knew that he was hired 
by Steve Keil to complete the work for the transaction. If we 
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assume that Combe did in fact hire Froerer under specific terms 
and obligations, then we must also assume that Combe knew that 
Froerer was representing both parties in the transaction. 
Froerer agrees with Combes' legal statement that "It is 
almost impossible for an attorney to adequately protect the 
interest of both the buyer and the seller in a real estate 
transaction." Beal v. Mars Larsen Ranch Corporation, Inc., 586 
P.2d 1378 (Idaho, 1978). If Froerer was to represent both 
parties, whom would he owe the duty to? Which party should he 
protect? A similar question was raised in the case of Smoot v. 
Lund, 13 Utah 2.d 168, 369 P.2d 933 (1962). In that case, 
Richard Smoot brought an action against an attorney, Howard Lund. 
He alleged that Lund was his attorney and owed him the duty of 
protection by preparing documents that would have protected him 
in the transaction. Smoot alleged that Lund should have included 
provisions in the contract that would have protected his interest 
over those of Lunds. The court stated at P. 936: 
In a situation such as that found here, where 
the attorney had represented a client, but 
entered into negotiations with him in which 
it was clearly apparent to the later that the 
attorney was dealing in his own interests, it 
is neither reasonable nor practical to 
suppose that the attorney will represent the 
client's interest to the entire exclusion of 
his own. Nor does the law require it. The 
plaintiffs appear to be intelligent, business 
people and they were dealing in a very 
substantial business transaction. There is 
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nothing mysterious or inscrutable about this 
contract • They were able to read and 
understand it and they do not claim to the 
contrary; nor do they allege any concealment 
of deception as to its contents. 
In this particular case, Combes were experienced in 
real estate transactions. He ran his own business and performed 
many of his own legal services. It would be unrealistic for 
Combe to feel that Froerer would represent Combes' interest over 
and above Froerer's client, Steve Keil in the preparation of the 
documents of this case. Especially when Combe had his attorney, 
Paul Kunzf review and modify the documents before he would sign 
them. Combes presented no evidence to show that he made such 
specific requests to Froerer nor did he present any evidence to 
show that Froerer was aware that Froerer was suppose to be 
protecting Combes' interest. In fact, viewing the evidence in 
light most favorable to Combe, the evidence could show that 
Froerer was nothing more than a scrivener putting together a 
contract under the terms that were given to him by his client, 
Steve Keil. Froerer, therefore, had no duty to verify the facts, 
question the terms of the contract, or form an opinion as to the 
fairness of such terms. Milliner v. Elmer Fox & Co., 529 P.2d 
806, 808 (Utah, 1974). 
POINT III 
FROERER'S ALLEGED NEGLIGENCE CAUSED NO DAMAGE TO 
COMBE AND THEREFORE NO CLAIM FOR NEGLIGENCE CAM 
BE MAINTAINED 
The facts are uncontroverted that Combes were owners 
of the property since 1962. They had received it from Phillip C. 
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Combe and Verla M. Combe, the parents of Keith B. Combe. (See, R 
1416, Exhibits 1 to Keith Combe's depo.) The Combes had owned 
the property up to the time of the transaction in December, 1979. 
The Combes had tried to sell the property on several occasions 
and in fact had sold it at least one time before. (See, R.1416, 
Exhibit 6 to Combe's depo.) 
A final judgment of condemnation had been entered by 
the Honorable Charles G. Cowley on the 23rd day of May, 1960, and 
was duly recorded in book 648, page 353, at the Clerk's office. 
(See, R.1416, Exhibit 32 to Combe's depo.). The physical 
characteristics of the property were the same before the 
transaction as it was when the court ordered recision of the 
contract and the property was returned to the Combes. The facts 
are uncontroverted that no action of the defendant Froerer, no 
action of the defendant Attorney's Title Guaranty Fund, and no 
action of the plaintiff Breuer-Harrison caused the easement to 
come upon the property in question. In fact, the easement had 
always been in existence throughout the whole time the Combes 
owned and attempted to sell the property. In other words, the 
Combes received back exactly what they had before the transaction 
was entered into. 
It is a well settled principal of law that if a party 
suffers no damages as a result of negligent actions of an 
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attorney no claim of malpractice can be maintained. Dunn v. 
McKay, Burton, McMurrav and Thurman, 584 P.2d 894 at 896 (Utah, 
1978), Smoot v. Lund, 369 P.2d 933 at 936 (Utah, 1962). 
Combe argues that because he cannot sell the property 
for what he sold it to plaintiff, Breuer-Harrison, that he is 
damaged by the difference in value. Combe fails to recognize 
that the reason the contract was rescinded by Judge Hyde in the 
first place is that the value of the property was originally 
determined by buyer and seller based upon a mistake of fact, i.e. 
no easements or encumbrances. Combes argument for damages 
therefore must fail as a matter of law. Whatever the value of 
the property was, Combe still had the same property in its same 
condition and therefore cannot claim that any acts of defendant 
Froerer caused the property to loose value. Since no damages 
could be established by Combe, the trial court was correct in 
ruling as a matter of law that he had no claim against attorney 
Froerer. 
POINT IV 
COMBE AS OWNER OF THE PROPERTY WAS CHARGED WITH CONSTRUCTIVE 
NOTICE OF THE EASEMENT AND THEREFORE CANNOT COMPLAIN 
THAT OTHER PARTIES SHOULD HAVE INFORMED HIM AS TO THE 
QUANTITY AND QUALITY OF HIS PROPERTY BEFORE ALLOWING HIM 
TO ENTER INTO THIS TRANSACTION 
Combe takes the position that all other parties and 
their attorneys should be insurers of his obligations. This 
16 
position is untenable. Combes were the owners of the property 
and were charged with knowledge of its quality and status. 
Crompton v. Jensen, 1 P.2d 242 (Utah, 1931), Flying Diamond Oil 
Corp. v. Newton Sheep Co., 109 Utah Adv. Rpt. 11 at P. 18 (Utah, 
1989). Combe presented no evidence that he advised Froerer of 
the condition of the property or that he requested Froerer to 
perform a title search on the property before closing. In fact, 
the evidence showed that Combe completed the closing at his own 
instance by obtaining signatures on the documents without even 
telling Froerer that the transaction had closed. Since Combe had 
knowledge of the status of his property pursuant to Utah law and 
could understand the contract which he signed, he cannot now 
complain that it required an unencumbered title to be conveyed. 
POINT V 
COMBES' CLAIMS AGAINST FROERER ARE BARRED BY THE STATUTE 
OF LIMITATIONS 
Combes allege that Froerer committed negligence in 
December, 1979, when Froerer allowed the transaction to close 
without protecting Combes interest. Combes claim is either one 
of negligence or one of breach of contract. Combe presented no 
evidence to show that there was a written contract in existence 
between Combe and Froerer which would have allowed a six year 
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statute of limitations therefore 78-12-25, Utah Code Annotated 
1953 (as amended) governs. This statute requires Combes to bring 
their action within four years from the date of the alleged 
negligence. The Combes did not bring this action until August, 
1986. Combes did not allege fraud or mispresentation/ therefore 
this claim against Froerer must fail as untimely filed. 
CONCLUSION 
Combes' claims against attorney Froerer for negligence 
must be dismissed because Combe never denied that their own 
attorney, Paul Kunz, reviewed, modified and approved the 
documents in question. If there was malpractice, Combe should 
look to his own attorney, Paul Kunz. If Froerer wcis in fact 
representing both clients, then Froerer had no duty to protect 
Combe in the manner asserted in his amended cross-claim. Combe 
asserts that Froerer was negligent in withholding material 
information from them, but then failed to introduce any evidence 
to show that Combe even met with Froerer before the closing. No 
party requested that title work be completed before the closing 
and no party relied upon any title work that was accomplished. 
Combe can show no damages as a result of any action 
taken by Froerer and the Combes failed to file their claijn 
against Froerer within the applicable limitation provided by Utah 
Statute. The District Court was therefore correct in ruling as a 
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matter of law that Combe had no claim against Froerer either as 
an attorney or as an abstractor of title and properly entered 
summary judgment dismissing Combes' amended cross-claim. 
This Court should do likewise as Combe can present no 
legal basis nor facts upon which he can sustain a cause of 
action. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 10th day of July, 1989. 
HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH 
THEODORE E. KANELL 
Attorney for Respondent 
Robert Froerer 
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I hereby certify that on the /Q day of July, 1989, 
four true and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF 
RESPONDENT FROERER was mailed, postage prepaid, to the 
following: 
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER 
John P. Ashton and Erik Strindberg 
City Centre I, Suite 900 
175 East Fourth South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Appellants Combes 
JACK L. SCHOENHALS 
1200 Beneficial Life Tower 
36 South State Street 
Attorney for Respondents 
Breuer and Harrison 
ARMSTRONG, RAWLINGS & WEST 
David E. West 
1300 Walker Center 
175 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Respondent 
Attorney's Title Guaranty Fund 
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